Corporatism, liberal developmentalism, and dependencia are the major approaches to the study of Latin American politics one is likely to encounter in recent and current scholarship. The proponents of each urge its adoption to the exclusion of others. Professors Martz and Myers argue that this inclination produces generalizations that not only misrepresent the reality of Latin American politics but also fail to convey the rich diversity of its intellectual tradition in which monism, liberal pluralism, and Marxism have long coexisted, even mingled.

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The immensely variegated tapestry of Latin American politics and society is woven from many intellectual and philosophical strands. The coloring is alternatingly dramatic and subtle, the textures richly diverse. Those who would view, absorb, and interpret the total fabric have been similarly diverse in their perceptions and interpretations of these images. Efforts to generalize about the warp and woof of Latin American politics have produced a host of analytic schools and approaches, which in turn have rested upon disparate constructs of reality. Granted an increasing level of conceptual and theoretical sophistication in recent and contemporary scholarship, there is also a proclivity for advocates of one approach to eschew the contributions of those whose outlook is different. One of the evident challenges now facing scholars and students is the necessity of probing more deeply, attempting to advance the state of
the art through incorporation of tenets drawn from the present plurality of approaches.

To do so requires a recognition of the rich diversity of Latin American intellectual traditions, formulated and articulated across four centuries. Those who elaborate "modern" analytic constructs without taking account of the legacy of past patterns of thought will but encourage generalizations and theoretical frameworks that become often incomplete or distorted reflections of reality. In assessing the study of Latin American politics, we would contend that, as Stepan has pointed out, three broad intellectual currents inform and shape contemporary scholarship.¹ For the sake of convenience they can be termed monist or organicist, liberal pluralist, and marxist, although we must caution that general rubrics of this nature have a somewhat limited heuristic value. With each current the impact of political philosophy and the intellectual heritage of the Latin American experience is paramount. Central to our exploration is the assumption that such philosophical and experiential factors constitute a dimension which is crucial to an understanding of diverse analytic approaches.

We would insist that at the core of all such theorizing lie fundamental issues concerning the individual, his place in society, and the role of the state in overseeing the conduct of public affairs. Either consciously or unknowingly, those who would delineate a framework for Latin American politics are engaged in theorizing about central and universal concepts. The legacy of political thought, from classical times to the present, must retain our attention. Thus, before undertaking an assessment of contemporary modes of analysis, it is incumbent upon us to trace the roots of the three distinct intellectual traditions, for these impinge upon and help to clarify the diversity of contemporary theorizing. Moreover, the incorporation of these traditions is to engage in the time-honored recognition of the pervasive impact of ideas.

With Johnson, we believe that "political theory, at least where Latin America is concerned, is a body of prescriptive beliefs about how the body politic and the government ought to function, what should be the optimal preferred set of relationships between man and the State, and what values and goals ought to be organically central to the system." ²

In addition to the prescriptive, it is also important to include normative elements as applied to society. This insistence upon the relevance of philosophy and humanistic concerns is mirrored throughout the Latin American experience.

Our agenda, then, must begin with an inquiry into the intellectual underpinnings that have emerged with the unfolding of history. This will provide the context within which the three major traditions and their corresponding modes of analyzing Latin American politics may be reviewed. It will become evident as we proceed, that although the assumptions on which each of the three traditions is based may have dominated at a given time in a particular country, all three have endured in Latin American political culture. Moreover, important elements of each can be identified in the frameworks and abstractions of modern scholarship.

As we suggest later, the three distinctive modes of conceptualization which characterize contemporary literature are broadly parallel to the overarching intellectual traditions. This need not necessarily, or inevitably, follow but it does happen to be the case with reference to Latin America. Perhaps more important is our belief that analytic models must incorporate elements from all three intellectual traditions. To do otherwise, as has been the practice in recent years, is to produce theoretical frameworks of an exclusionary character which deny the fullness of the Latin American experience. In short, the sharpening of contemporary theorizing requires an appreciation of the continuing presence of all three traditions. It mandates a broadening of perspectives.

Our immediate task, then, is to identify the philosophical roots of the analytic models described in the subsequent section. This will lead in turn to a further consideration of the relationship between traditions and models, suggesting the wisdom of broader and more inclusive thinking to guide future research.

I. Intellectual and Philosophical Roots

Monism

The monist or organicist tradition, chronologically the oldest of the three, stressed the distinctive Iberic-Latin legacy emanating from southern Europe. Roman law and governance, the Thomistic tradition, feudalism and the system of medieval guilds, the prolonged struggle to expel the Moors—all were elements in the development of monism. Assumptions about the governing of man were reified in absolutist centralization, the unification of social groupings, and a militantly narrow spiritual outlook. Running through this tradition was the vision of an organic
political community, the components of which were to harmonize the quest for man's self-fulfillment.

Iberian monism, subsequently transferred to Latin America, had in a sense branched off from the mainstream of Western intellectual thought before the Enlightenment and prior to the writings of major social-contract theorists. It was most vividly expounded in sixteenth-century Spain, the cradle of the Counter-Reformation. Among the more influential and characteristic expressions of Catholic reaction against the dissidence dividing Christianity were the Council of Trent (1545–1563) and the founding of the Society of Jesus (1536). The former was promoted indefatigably by Charles I in the great offensive to adopt measures tightening the solidarity of Catholicism and defending its articles of faith. The Society of Jesus, approved by papal bull in September 1540, conceived of its role as a militant consecration to God and to absolute submission, except in the case of sin, to the Pope. Members were subject to unquestioning obedience—"as if they were cadavers that let themselves be moved hither and yon and dealt with at will." 3

This tradition could be traced back to Aristotle; carried through the Roman extension from natural to human law; elaborated with Augustine's "City of Man" as one of law; and further refined by the profundity of Aquinas. The Thomist revival in Spain was bounded by considerations of morality and law. The Dominican Francisco de Vitoria, while respecting royal absolutism and power, nonetheless saw divine authority vested in the king as pertaining to the natural community. Perhaps naively, he argued that the monarch was bound by his own laws as well as by divine revelation. The ruler might ask but should not compel his subjects to accept Christianity, as Vitoria declared in his lectures De Indis I and De Indiis II (1537–1539), which constituted in sum "a classical statement of the rights of backward peoples to be treated as men." 4

The figure who most importantly brought together the traditions of Thomism and Spanish law in articulating a monist view of authority was the Jesuit theologian and jurist, Francisco Suárez. Like Bellarmine before him, Suárez saw the pope as spiritual leader of a family of Christian nations, with the Church the universal divine institution. In contrast,

the state was a human institution, originating in a union of heads of families. The consequent civil society possessed the right and power to control its members. This power derived from the community, existed for its welfare, and could be changed if necessary.

Suárez regarded royal authority as dominant: "once power has been transferred to the king, he is at once the vicar of God and by natural law must be obeyed ... the transference of power from the community to the prince is not a delegation but almost an abrogation, that is, a total grant of power which was formerly in a community." Yet, Suárez did not teach that the monarch could, with impunity, ignore or violate the law. Unshared power was not the same as tyrannical authority. The community's transmission of authority to the monarch had been accompanied by an understanding that limited its exercise. For Suárez, as with Vitoria before him, the king must share the community's burdens and, like it, respect existing laws. Domingo de Soto, a contemporary, put it well:

[B]y the very fact that a prince makes a law, he becomes subject to it himself by the law of nature. Perhaps this can be proved more clearly as follows: the legislator (as we said) in making a law places an action in a certain definite category of virtue.... Once the act of virtue has been decided upon, the whole community, and therefore also the head of it, is bound to act in accordance with it.

In recapitulating Thomist thought, Suárez distinguished natural law from conscience, saw royal authority as originating with the collectivity of man, and regarded the king as committed to the observance of law. As Morse put it, Suárez personified a post-medieval Hispano-Catholic view of man, society, and state which offered a sophisticated statement of the sociological realities of the Spanish patrimonial state. The two decisive principles were organicism and patriarchalism. Thus, society was "a hierarchical system in which each person or group serves a purpose larger than any one of them can encompass.... To the social hierarchy corresponds a scale of inequalities and imperfections that should be corrected only when Christian justice is in jeopardy." Con-

6. As quoted in Hamilton, Political Thought, p. 66.
sistent with the normative themes of monism, it was held that man might ultimately be fulfilled only within a community—one in which institutions of governance required discipline, order, and authority. Natural law insisted that man was morally entitled to conditions permitting realization of his full spiritual and intellectual potential, dependent in turn on the organicist primacy of the common public good over the private interest.

The above position rested on an assumption of asymmetrical relationships among nonequals, characterized by civic deference to the power of the ultimate authority—in effect, the patrón. Suárez and his sixteenth-century confreres anticipated the modern theory of the organic monist state, assuming a hierarchically ordered universe marked by the existence of natural inequalities. Governance was necessary to preserve social harmony and order. As the Latin American experience was to show, there was a powerfully enduring quality to monist tradition. From Aristotle through St. Thomas and Suárez to modern papal encyclicals, the belief has persisted that man can be fulfilled only within a community, and that a well-ordered political community is therefore necessary. As we note below in discussing contemporary corporatist theories, the impact of this intellectual stream has remained strong and vibrant. Undeniably, as one scholar says:

The major European religious influence appears in a persistently Roman Catholic spirit inherited from Portugal and Spain. This religious influence is reinforced by a heritage of Roman Law that gives a rational and authoritarian natural law cast to the political and legal thought of all peoples of Spanish and Portuguese speech.8

The Enlightenment Tradition

In due course the ideas of the Enlightenment were communicated to Latin America. Jesuit rationalism and humanism expressed elements of populist republicanism sympathetic to criollo desires for expanded self-rule in the New World. Jesuit scholars were among those “who shaped colonial social consciousness by spreading rational and humanist ideas through their schools and monasteries.” 9 The early Enlightenment of sixteenth-century Europe did not reach the Iberian Peninsula, but some penetration did occur by the mid-1700’s. Emerging social-contract theory increasingly suggested that freedom and liberty called for dividing

9. Ibid., p. 27.
authority between rulers and ruled. Natural law was thus confronted by notions of a secular commonwealth. Newton triumphantly extended the scientific trajectory plotted by Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo. He stimulated the scientific conceptualizing which distinguished the seventeenth century from the prevailing medieval character of the sixteenth.

With Cartesian science being supplanted by that of Newton, the writings of John Locke, notably his *Two Treatises of Government* (1690), provided the basis for a tradition of liberal constitutionalism which broke from medieval scholasticism. Locke asserted the right to private property as one rooted in human nature, and he envisaged civil society and governance as dependent upon majority will. He went on to declare that governments were mere instruments for preserving individual rights. Locke's work, even if somewhat loose in structure and reasoning, shaped the attitudes that later surfaced in the French and North American revolutions. Thus, Locke became a powerful force in propagating the ideal of liberal but nonviolent reform. Liberty, individual rights, and human dignity were to be foremost.

Other strains of liberal-pluralist thought also reached the New World. Montesquieu, for one, sought to identify governmental forms capable of providing a stable adjustment of society and individual rights. The inductive study of individual cases suggested solutions based on checks and balances, and on the supremacy of civil law. In the final analysis, the constitutional state would preserve and protect the citizen and his rights. Contemporaneously, Voltaire underlined the importance of individual freedoms. If relatively disinterested in the people as a collectivity, he was profoundly committed to the right of self-expression and to the primacy of reason. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, although less directly influential on what would become liberal pluralism in Latin America, contributed through his concern with the problem of equality.

Spain itself was not immune to the Enlightenment. The encyclopedic writings of Padre Benito Feijoo y Montenegro provided important impetus to the introduction of previously alien ideas. In time, "Spain responded readily to the stimulus of the Enlightenment with a notable scientific revival, the organization of many academies and institutions, and the production of a long line of books that breathe the spirit of the Enlightenment." ¹⁰ Special academies and institutes flourished; reforms at Salamanca during 1769–1787 permitted the reading of Newton, Bacon, and Locke; and the Spanish state patronized such undertakings

as the 1735 expedition to Quito under Charles-Marie de La Condamine to study the equatorial arc. Without retracing the familiar outlines of reform under Charles III, it is indisputable that medieval Spain itself underwent change. The transmission of Enlightenment ideas to Latin America can also be documented.

In Latin American universities and seminaries, older Thomist principles were at times supplemented by the study of Condillac, Descartes, and Newton, and the logic of Cartesian and Lockian rationalism was not unknown. It was a time of enlarging intellectual vistas and broadening sources of inspiration.

The influence of such scholars as the Portuguese Luis Antonio Verney (1713–1792), the Spanish priest, Benito Gerónimo Feijóo, and the Peruvian Pedro Peralta Barnuevo, had caused widespread discussion of Newton's law of universal gravitation, Etienne Bonnot Condillac's sensationalism, the natural moral philosophy of Nicolas de Melébranche, and even the pantheism of Baruch Spinoza. Although these new ideas were not always accepted fully, their discussion prepared Latin American leaders to accept the ideas of Voltaire, Rousseau, Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Paine, Thomas Jefferson, and the Abbé Raynal.11

Granted the expansive character of such a statement, it suggests the reality of both monist and pluralist ideas reaching the eighteenth-century Latin American universities. By the close of the colonial period, the revolutionary struggles of France and the United States had become familiar to educated Latin Americans. Their political tracts and pamphlets had gained circulation among the intelligentsia, while private libraries contained translations of officially prohibited tracts. Paine, Jefferson, and Franklin were among those whose writings were discussed and disseminated.

Enlightenment concepts, then, were undeniably important to Latin American thought by the close of the eighteenth century. Scholars have traditionally acknowledged France and the United States "as the ideological source of both the structure and substance of Latin American government since 1810, while the influence of Spain, the mother country, is minimized or ignored." 12 More recently, revisionist analyses have

challenged this view. Dealy's study of twenty-seven Spanish American constitutions written between 1810 and 1816, for example, posits a discrepancy between Enlightenment ideas and the orientation of these documents. "Eighteenth-century political liberalism," he says, "was almost uniformly and overwhelmingly rejected by Spanish America's first statesmen." 13

This argument receives additional support from those who view the Latin American ethos as fundamentally monist. Some scholars maintain that, from colonial times on, Latin American thought has been consistent with the assumptions of an elitist, paternalistic social order marked by natural inequalities among men and a predominantly organic view of the state. In both spiritual and temporal realms, it is held, the traditions of medieval Spain have prevailed.

For the vast majority of persons, God could only be approached through the brokerage of saints or of the Virgin. In the process, religious beliefs and practices reinforced the conviction that human beings, on their own, were generally incapable of mastering their destiny. Action was not the result of the individual's willing it or of coalition and alliance among subordinates; instead, it resulted from an appeal to a superior being. 14

We would submit that Latin Americans had received and adapted elements of the monist as well as the pluralist case. The colonies in the 1700's were by no means veiled in ignorance and obscurantism, bound to the teachings of sixteenth-century Spanish theorists. Enlightenment ideas clearly attracted their own advocates, although arriving at a later juncture. They did not displace the earlier tradition; they were in effect superimposed upon it. To understand the Latin American philosophical world view is to recognize the concurrent presence of both traditions. A third would be introduced in the twentieth century.

Marxism

Following the Enlightenment, the idea of individual rights seemed to have triumphed over older collectivist notions. But the latter were perhaps inevitably revived by the French Revolution and by the contradictions of Western Europe industrial capitalism in the nineteenth century. This resulted in a radical tradition which emphasized problems of social

13. Ibid., 43.
inequality. Where Enlightenment thought had stressed political liberties, the new radicalism sought to redress human grievances and meet the needs of the collectivity. Envisaging a more just and harmonious society, it also reflected a secular morality which, in some cases, produced militancy. Furthermore, the greater concern with modes of human activity introduced a greater concern with the organization of labor and its role in daily life.

In Europe, the century of the Industrial Revolution demonstrated that individual liberty could as well promote evil as good. "Abuses of liberty on the part of economic overlords had become as ruinous to the welfare of the subjected masses as abuses of authority on the part of political overlords had been in former times." A new wave of theorizing encouraged utopianism and rationalism as expressed by such thinkers as Robert Owen and Joseph Proudhon. Their followers would be instrumental in bringing together the First International and in directing attention to the workplace. Louis Blanc wanted nascent socialism to be of service to the working class. The forging of these ideas, including those of Mikhail Bakunin, contributed to syndicalist and anarchist thought which further enriched the radical tradition.

Fuller elaboration was to come from Karl Marx. He would become "for the modern era what Socrates was to the antique: the symbol of people's power over their destiny." His analysis of capitalism projected those social crises from which socialism would evolve. The historical progression from feudalism and precapitalism would cause a distorted form of industrialism, provoking those social conditions from which struggle and ultimate revolution would ensue. Successors to Marx took separate paths—the more militant that of Lenin, whereas the moderate followed the revisionism of Eduard Bernstein and social democracy. The plethora of later adaptations—Trotsky, Gramsci, Mao, et al.—shared the radical passion for exposing the weaknesses of Enlightenment liberalism and challenging the social order spawned in northwestern Europe.

Marx, of course, had predicted socialism in the most highly industrialized countries. The translation of marxism to the Latin American setting was therefore fraught with doctrinal and philosophical obstacles. Unsurprisingly, there were very few references to Latin America in the statements of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Kautsky, and others. Consequently,

Latin American Marxists were confronted “with the task of constructing, without guidance, an original Marxist interpretation of Latin American reality, and then promoting its acceptance in countries where very few men were well-versed in philosophy, sociology, or economics—to say nothing of dialectical materialism.”  

For many years, thoughtful interpreters of Marxist ideas in Latin America were few in number. 

“While vaguely socialistic ideas reached the Americas in the late 1800's through the importation of European utopian socialism, Marxist ideas first acquired significance with the wave of European immigrants reaching the Plate River region at the turn of the century.”  

Within a generation a vocal urban proletariat, receptive to radical formulae, had appeared. Ideological appeals to burgeoning trade unionism spread to socialist political parties; marxist concepts came to the streets from the salons of the literati. Argentine socialists with Juan B. Justo, and those with Emilio Frugoni in Uruguay, epitomized early efforts to shape Marxist ideas to Latin American reality. As the former said in 1896, “We must adopt without hesitation all that is science: we will be revolutionary... but quite unlike those false revolutionaries... whose sole interest is in upsetting what exists.”

These early spokesmen readily conceded the need for adaptations of Marxism appropriate to the local setting. Frugoni was characteristic in treating socialism as broader than pure Marxism. Not merely a rigidly applicable formulation, socialism was also a movement which answers needs that are far removed from any theory, a current of anxiety, of hopes, of desires for social and human justice. For these things, Marxism is a channel, and as such it acts as a guide, but certainly a channel is not the whole river.

The Russian Revolution and its aftermath cast a pall of homogenizing orthodoxy on expressions of Latin American Marxism. Among the few who made significant efforts to reexamine the tradition within the existing milieu were the Peruvians José Carlos Mariátegui and Víctor Raúl

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19. As quoted in Enrique Dickmann, Recuerdos de un militante socialista (Buenos Aires: Vanguardia, 1949), pp. 84–85.
Haya de la Torre. The former was an innovative and eclectic spokesman for a humanistic socialism; the latter went so far as to reverse Marx’ stages of history in order to fit the philosopher’s vision to the region.

More recent formulations followed the inspiration of the Cuban Revolution and the Allende years in Chile; the former was particularly influential in stimulating the diverse statements of the so-called New Left. Whereas Che Guevara advocated a humane Marxism which verged on the utopian, Fidel Castro adopted a more pragmatic outlook. As he admonished in a speech in 1965: “Let us beware of those Marxist-Leninists who are only and exclusively worried about philosophical questions, for socialism has many practical and serious problems to solve.” 21 For our present purposes, however, variations of basic themes are less important than the vitality of the Marxist intellectual tradition. Basic concerns presented a blend of proletarian collectivism accompanied by a humanistic concern with individual socioeconomic rights and an eradication of injustice. Institutional formulations emphasized the role of a highly centralized state whose authority would be no less expansive than that envisaged by monists.

The Marxist current, then, further underlines the coexistence and admixture of intellectual traditions in Latin America. Its intrinsic durability seems assured by the anguishing conditions under which so many still live. Friedrich Engel’s description of nineteenth-century British workers’ conditions is scarcely irrelevant to Latin America.

The way in which the vast mass of the poor are treated by modern society is truly scandalous. They are herded into great cities where they breathe a fouler air than in the countryside which they have left. They are housed in the worst ventilated districts of the towns; they are deprived of all means of keeping clean. . . . Their mental state is threatened by being subjected alternately to extremes of hope and fear. They are goaded like wild beasts and never have a chance of enjoying a quiet life. They are deprived of all pleasures except sexual indulgence and intoxicating liquors. . . . If the workers manage to survive this sort of treatment it is only to fall victims to starvation when a slump occurs and they are deprived of the little that they once had.22

II. Contemporary Approaches and Modes of Analysis

It is from the three fundamental philosophical currents previously described that modern scholarship—knowingly or not—has sought to evolve theories of Latin American politics. The modes of analysis current during the past generation have tended toward a clannish exclusivity. Each has enjoyed a period of intellectual faddishness during which its advocates claimed a monopoly over theoretical insights. In time, withering fire from critics has been attracted, assumptions challenged, facts altered or denied, even motivations questioned in fierce dialogue. Like many political scientists, Latin American specialists have been fickle. They have not only been willing to yield to the Circean seductiveness of "new" conceptual commitments, they have tended to ignore political systems that deviated "from the norms of prevailing analytic trends." It is to a reconsideration of these recent trends that we must now turn.

**Liberal Developmentalism**

The intellectual impulses which drove the theorists of the 1950's and much of the 1960's were either explicitly or indirectly linked to the tradition of the Enlightenment. Many accepted the ineluctable assumption that Western Democracy would soon reach at least the more advanced nations of Latin America. They assumed, largely as an act of faith, that the universality of liberal democracy was not debatable even if its social and economic consequences might be. There was tacit agreement with the views of Lord Bryce voiced in the 1920's, seemingly a fortuitous moment for the champions of liberal democracy: "the time seems to have arrived when the actualities of democratic government, in its diverse forms, should be investigated, and when the conditions most favorable to its success should receive more attention." This advice informed "modern" formulations of paradigms and models in the late 1950's and thereafter. Liberal developmentalism originated with political scientists many of whom, it must be said, were largely unschooled in Third-World realities. Pluralist predispositions influenced efforts to analyze total systems following David Easton. The rediscov-
ery of Bentley's writings on group theory and the further elaboration by David Truman were widely admired.\textsuperscript{26} Even more appealing was Talcott Parsons' structural-functionalism as refined for the study of comparative politics by Gabriel Almond and his associates.

Liberal developmentalism embraced a faith in evolutionary growth as drawn from the history of industrial nations. The quest for "modernity" led to the presumed certainty of change from underdeveloped to developed societies. The motor force was to come from pluralist political systems emulating European and United States models. Schema were introduced to telescope historical stages in the hope of producing a universalistic and unilinear progression toward a good society envisaged without regard to cultural distinctions. The developmentalists accepted the classic notion of cumulative scientific progress, and often regarded progress as inevitable. Moreover, as Hirschman later observed, they assumed a positive relationship between economic growth and political democracy as an essential part of their persuasion. This paralleled philosophers and economists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries whose thought had shaped the ideological bases for Western democracy. Thus, "a thriving market economy would be the basis for a political order in which the exercise of individual rights and freedoms would be insured."\textsuperscript{27} Or, as Tocqueville had observed: "A close tie and a necessary relation exist between these two things: freedom and industry."\textsuperscript{28}

Political currents in Latin America seemed hospitable to the liberal developmentalists, with Western-style democracy on the march. In 1959 a semipopular work could be entitled \textit{The Twilight of the Tyrants},\textsuperscript{29} and the rhetoric of the Alliance for Progress was omnipresent. Military intervention seemed on the wane, middle sectors were viewed as standard bearers of an enlightened reformism, and there was enthusiasm for such Social Democratic and Christian Democratic leaders as Rómulo Betancourt, José Figueres, Eduardo Frei, and Rafael Caldera. Yet expectations were soon to be disappointed. Hard political reality frustrated the Aristotelian assumptions of developmentalism, which in teleological


\textsuperscript{28} As quoted in Collier, \textit{The New Authoritarianism}, pp. 62–63.

\textsuperscript{29} Tad Szulc, \textit{Twilight of the Tyrants} (New York: Praeger, 1959).
fashion had predicted the realization of human potential in concert with distributive justice. By the close of the 1960's a new wave of military authoritarianism had supplanted a number of elected governments.

An emergent concentration by some scholars on crises of political development did little to alter basic conceptual predispositions. The work of the Social Science Research Council Committee on Comparative Politics tended to treat development not as a neutral process but as an ethical good. The prevailing developmentalist optic remained focused on ethnocentric definitions of democracy and its underlying assumptions. Given their belief in scientific progress, liberal developmentalists were frustrated by situations in which relative underdevelopment rather than anticipated modernization ensued. Their theoretical model turned out to be ahistoric.

The universalistic claim of developmentalism and its presumed sequential evolution in fact served to obscure the historical distinction between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As one Marxist critic put it, "Rostow and others have examined the developed countries as if they had developed in isolation from world history." In time, even firmly traditionalistic North American students of Latin America came to recognize the conservative basis of "their" social science. Addressing himself to the pervasive orthodoxy in United States academia, Hirschman wrote:

Most social scientists conceive it as their exclusive task to discover and stress regularities, stable relationships, and uniform sequences. This is obviously an essential search, one in which no thinking person can refrain from participating. But in the social sciences there is a special room for the opposite type of endeavor: to underline the multiplicity and creative disorder of the human adventure, to bring out the uniqueness of a certain occurrence, and to perceive an entirely new way of turning a historical corner.

30. Ultimately over a half-dozen volumes were produced by the SSRC Committee on Comparative Politics, all published by Princeton University Press. For a cogent review and critique, see Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, "Crisis and Sequences in Collective Theory Development," *The American Political Science Review* 69, no. 3 (September 1975): 979–995.


From structures and functions, from unilinear evolution through historical stages, and from analyses of developmental crises, the liberal developmentalist approach had exposed itself to disturbing criticisms which treated it as inappropriate to Latin America.

Inevitably, some criticisms were unjust. Attacks on teleological and ethnocentric flaws failed to recognize the revisions which had been made. Almond in particular was responsive—his later work, notably the 1978 edition of his classic, greatly diminished the teleological element. Others also undertook refinements of earlier theorizing in the light of criticism. Liberal developmentalist contributions did not merit unqualified dismissal. Nonetheless, the intellectual and political context would soon encourage perspectives basically hostile to those of the liberal developmentalists.

**Dependencia**

The intellectual progenitors of *dependencia* thought were overwhelmingly Latin American. Familiar with both Marxism and the observable realities of daily life in the region, they viewed underdevelopment as a result of capitalist domination and neocolonialism. They saw dependency as the root cause of economic and political inequality. Liberal developmentalism would assure the persistence of dependency and its products—economic injustice and nonrepresentative sociopolitical structures. Manifest failures of the developmentalist model were itemized in terms of the shortcomings of import substitution industrialization, greater inequality of income distribution, and the growing incursions of foreign investment into the region's industrialization process.

*Dependentistas* called for new models that would originate in a national or regional situation, "and then borrow or develop theoretical tools to help them understand that situation." 34 They held that the earlier model, drawn principally from developmental experience outside the region, inevitably distorted Latin American reality. The colonial heritage was less a cultural system of values than a structure for persistent economic dependency. Linked to this belief was a strong mistrust of the universality principle. Glauçio Ary Dillon Soares presented the argument with well-honed precision.

The universality principle assumes . . . that what is happening in Latin America today can be explained by reference to the past or

present of industrial societies. It tends to grossly overestimate the similarities among nations and social systems. More important, however, it proceeds as if Latin American social formation and historical development could be understood using the same concepts that are applied to Western Europe and the United States. . . . The universality principle is a strong force against the creation of new concepts that would capture specific aspects of Latin American reality.35

These observers feared also that empirical investigation attempted to counterpose theory and the scientific method to knowledge relevant for practical action. As Octávio Ianni wrote, the processes and dynamics of reality would become intelligible only when the scientist grasped their nuances. "Social factors frequently turn out to be economic or political factors and vice versa. In other words, there are manifestations of social phenomena which are only fully expressed at the level of political action or economic behavior."36 Such alarums and prescriptions strengthened the study of interactions between politics and economics as shaped by historical events. There was dissection of both internal alterations in sociopolitical structures and of the links between domestic and international forces. In Dos Santos’ words:

Dependence is a conditioning situation in which the economies of one group of countries are conditioned by the development and expansion of others. A relationship of interdependence . . . becomes a dependent relationship when some countries can expand through self-impulsion while others . . . can only expand as a reflection of the expansion of the dominant countries, which may have positive or negative effects on their immediate development.37

In the United States, the early exponents of dependentista thought included Bodenheimer, Cockroft, Johnson, and Petras.38 A major text-

38. See Susanne Bodenheimer, The Ideology of Developmentalism (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1971); James D. Cockroft, André Gunder Frank, and Dale L. Johnson, Dependence and Underdevelopment: Latin Amer-
book stressed "models of diffusion and dependency," and case studies began to appear. A new generation of students and scholars was trained with greater intellectual breadth than in earlier years. Several consensual themes came to underlie the rather disparate dependencia literature, four of which were identified in an overview by Bath and James. First, underdevelopment was inseparable from the expansion of industrial capitalist nations. Second, as they quoted Sunkel, "underdevelopment and development are simply the two faces of a single universal process." Thus they were components of a unified system. Third, underdevelopment was not merely a precapitalist stage of historical evolution, but rather a persistent condition. Last, dependency embraced internal structures as well as international relationships.

The many permutations of dependency analysis, as with liberal developmentalism earlier, inevitably stimulated criticism. One of the more thoughtful dependentistas conceded that "no unified theory of dependency yet exists," but that a variety of theoretical positions "tends to cluster in the literature on dependency." A conceptual refinement which directly links theory to experience has not been achieved. Sharper criticism of what was termed the "consumption of dependency theory in the United States" came from one of its foremost exponents, Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Disturbed by unduly rigid constructs and unbridled dependentista faith in the ability to predict, he contended that the forces of history were neither immutable nor so deterministic as to be immune to man's best efforts.

Cardoso thought that a "vulgar dependencia" would be just as unsound and scientifically misused as "vulgar Marxism." He felt that much attention had unduly been directed toward definitional abstractions and typologies. Consequently, "instead of making a dialectical analysis of historical processes, conceiving of them as the result of struggles between classes and groups that define their interests and values in the..."
process of expansion as a mode of production, history is formalized."  

In sum, Cardoso viewed dependency less as a scientific theory than as a frame of reference for research. He pleaded the need "to avoid the simplistic reductionism so common among the present-day butterfly collectors who abound in the social sciences and who stroll through history . . . with the blissful illusion that their findings can remove from history all its ambiguities, conjectures, and surprises."  

This is not to suggest that dependencia is in need of an obituary. It attempted to remedy the earlier failure to link analyses of Latin American politics to external forces, reintroducing at the same time economic variables into research. It redirected attention toward "the relation between peripheral and metropolitan societies at a given moment in time" that highlighted "forms of domination which control the underdeveloped society and must be changed if the economic system is to survive."  

These economic and political relationships were seen to be such as to concentrate decision making in foreign hands, hence reinforcing dependency. This condition, it was argued, could be alleviated only through a fresh and imaginative blending of diverse social groups within the periphery countries as a means of building a more just consensus with metropolitan centers. 

Dependency thought insistently pointed to the linkages of external and domestic factors as they impinged upon conceptualization of politics in countries of the periphery. Students of urban politics employed the dependency perspective to undertake penetrating class analyses and thus delineated the configurations of internal dependency with greater precision. At the same time, the value-laden quality of dependentista theorizing served to weaken, if not to vitiate, some of its contributions. Not unlike liberal developmentalism or even monism, dependencia has been tied down to ideological and moralistic assumptions and concepts. 

44. Ibid., 21.  
Corporatism

Labels for this body of thought have included the corporatist, Iberian Catholic, Hispanic, monist, organicist, and their assorted variations. But whatever the rubric, this perspective stands in stark contrast to the two already discussed. Anderson has thus summarized its essentials:

There is a rough agreement that corporatism signifies a specific pattern of relations between the state and other social institutions and associations, one in which government plays the role of architect of political order, defining and delimiting the scope of interest group activity, coordinating the activities of private associations, creating explicit mechanisms of direct interest representation in public policy making. . . . The state is an active force consciously imposing design and structure on group process. Unlike totalitarianism, corporatism does not entail the comprehensive mobilization and politicization of society.

The initial impetus came largely from those who stressed Hispanic traditions and the links between Spain, Portugal, and their New-World colonies. Their world view, shaped largely by Thomism, rested on a Catholic, authoritarian, hierarchical, and patrimonial base. Richard Morse provided an early statement that highlighted the "fundamental alienation" between the two Americas. He suggested that North Americans, with an inherent intellectual suspicion of Catholic thought, were severely handicapped in comprehending Latin American culture and society. "How seriously," he asked, "have any of us dared to require a steeping in St. Thomas, Dante, and Suárez for those who would understand Latin America?"

In subsequent writings Morse and others elaborated the cultural revisionism which informs much corporatist theorizing. They drew upon Aristotle, Roman and medieval law, Thomism, and contemporary statements of Catholic social philosophy in forming their vision of contemporary society and politics.

In a work subtitled "An Interpretation of Latin American and Other Catholic Countries," Dealy sought to explicate the qualities which flow

47. Distinctions are often drawn, as with Stepan's view of organic statism as a normative approach to politics utilizable as an abstract model of governance, whereas corporatism signifies a particular set of policies and institutional arrangements for structuring interest representation. Cf. Stepan, State and Society, p. 46.
from the Catholic tradition. He relied on Augustine in probing the intel-
lectual and philosophical foundations of public and private life. Given
the doctrine of the Two Cities, an understanding of Latin America
seemed to require recognition of "the separation of the ethical world
into the public and the private." Corporatist philosophy took in some
of the Aristotelian tradition but grounded itself more deeply on the
writings of such scholasticists as Suárez and Vitoria. Dealy concluded
that the Latin American tradition had never been pluralist; it was and
remains fundamentally monist.

Political monism, or monistic democracy, was conceived as a central-
ization and control of potentially competing interests. It implied a unifi-
cation of groups at all levels of society: "an attempt to eliminate com-
petition among groups in their pursuit of wealth, power, prestige, or
whatever men may aspire to within a country." In challenging plural-
ist notions, it posited that the common good depended upon systemic
unity without which the state could not last. As St. Thomas had argued,
an ideal community required unity founded on the assumption that pri-
ivate interests must be relinquished in order to secure the common good.
In contrast, diversity could lead only to anarchy or to tyranny, thereby
mitigating against the common good.

Others would concur, as Wiarda felicitously put it, that "looking at
Latin America not through its own eyes but through our culture-bound
perspectives serves not only to perpetuate myths about the area but also
to retard our understanding of how Latin American institutions actually
do function." Yet they went beyond the cultural legacy in proffering
more subtle refinements of corporatism. In addition to Wiarda, Newton
and Pike stressed the importance of analyzing institutions and struc-

50. Glen Caudill Dealy, The Public Man: An Interpretation of Latin American
and Other Catholic Countries (Amherst, Mass.: University of Massachusetts Press,

51. Also see Dealy, "The Tradition of Monistic Democracy in Latin America,"
in Howard J. Wiarda, ed., Politics and Social Change in Latin America: The
Distinct Tradition (Amherst, Mass.: University of Massachusetts Press, 1974),
pp. 71-104.

52. Ibid., p. 73.

53. From St. Thomas Aquinas, De Rigimine Principum, quoted in Dealy, "Tra-

54. Wiarda, Continuing Struggle, p. 16.

55. An influential statement by Wiarda was his "Toward a Framework for the
Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporative Model,"
World Politics 25, no. 1 (January 1973):206-235. His later works, several cited
herein, provide progressively more penetrating and thoughtful insights into
the character of the model.
As interpretive diversity flourished, policy-making styles and political dynamics attracted attention. Schmitter produced a widely-cited definition which envisaged the corporatist polity as one

in which the constituent units are organized into a fixed number of singular, ideologically selective, noncompetitive, functionally differentiated and hierarchically ordered categories, created, subsidized and licensed by a single party and granted a representation role within that party and vis-à-vis the state in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders, articulation of demands and mobilization of support.

More encompassing efforts, such as the recent historical re-examination of Latin America by Veliz, have cast the monist net even more broadly —perhaps too sweepingly to avoid the pitfalls of overgeneralization.

A related stream of thought had meantime emerged in the guise of bureaucratic authoritarianism. Once again, contemporary events played a role in the counterpoint of scholarly dialogue and reassessment. Just as the wave of party-based liberal democracies had encouraged developmental theorizing at the start of the 1960’s, the very failure of many such regimes by the close of the decade helped to fuel new explorations. Corporatist definitions of structures and institutions were linked to modernizing authoritarianism. As military regimes proliferated, “analysts began to point out that the standard theoretical frameworks . . . were inadequate to analyze the important role of the state in Latin America or to deal with the complex process by which the interactions between the state and organized societal groupings have been structured and restructured over time.”


political currents were clearly a stimulus for Guillermo O'Donnell, whose book in 1973 proved to be highly influential.

Criticizing liberal developmentalism, O'Donnell contended that modernization in developing areas led not to pluralism but to authoritarianism. "In contemporary South America, the higher and lower levels of modernization are associated with nondemocratic political systems, while political democracies are found at the intermediate levels of modernization." 60 Employing a structuralist approach in which extrapoliical factors were crucial, he portrayed corporatism as a response to rapid social mobilization in industrialized societies integrated into the international economic system. Later restatements extended his theoretical base more broadly and provoked debate. In 1982 a thoughtful critique by Remmer and Merkx, accompanied by O'Donnell's response,61 underlined the continuing exploration of authoritarianism. Implicitly, it also suggested the importance of blending elements of the several diverse perspectives in the quest for greater understanding and stronger heuristic analytic models.

III. The Integrative Imperative

The exclusivity of much contemporary theorizing and model-building has already been observed. Frequent denials to the contrary notwithstanding, insistence upon the wisdom of one perspective, to the detriment of all others, has permeated much of the literature. For instance, in a recent disquisition on the centralist tradition, Veliz dismisses both liberalism and Marxism as "exotic" dogma irrelevant to the purported uniqueness of Latin American politics. Yet such claims run contrary to the coexistence of disparate intellectual formulations across several centuries that suggest the relevance of integration rather than exclusivity.

The Latin American Intellectual Milieu

At the very core of these currents of thought lie fundamental issues concerning the rights and relationships between and among the individual,

society, and state. The transferral and adaptation of both monist and Enlightenment traditions toward the close of the colonial era assured sharp intellectual conflict following the expulsion of royal authority. The nineteenth-century milieu was marked by a tension between exponents of individual liberty and governmental authority. Those who emphasized the former, drawing upon Enlightenment ideas, contended that the individual must be protected against possible abuses of power by the rulers. Social-contract theories had called for a division of authority between the individual and the government, with society based upon the consent of its members and the supremacy of civil law.

There were successive periods of romantic liberalism, positivism, and idealism, each of which attempted to resolve the contradictions between freedom and authority. Independence from colonial rule did not provide meaningful individual freedom to the majority. The masses remained in subordination, and movements espousing freedom and human dignity failed to extend these tenets to the dispossessed. Adaptations of European positivism late in the 1800's did not enhance individual rights; rather, they supplied a philosophic rationale for authoritarian regimes more consistent with monist teachings. The brief flourishes of philosophical idealism subsequently provided little further insight into the relationship of the individual, state, and society.

Nineteenth-century pensadores grappled ceaselessly with the concepts of individual liberty and freedom. As early as 1813 Bolívar epitomized the conflict by describing a federal system as the most perfect and ideal, yet inappropriate for Latin America. "Our fellow-citizens are not yet able to exercise their rights themselves in the fullest measure, because they lack the political virtues that characterize true republicans—virtues that are not acquired under absolute governments, where the rights and duties of the citizen are not recognized." 62 In 1819 his Angostura Discourse, while warning of unfettered authoritarianism, placed even greater emphasis on guarding against the chaos of undisciplined liberty. The Liberator was, once again, torn between fear of an uneducated mass and the paternalistic rule of a small dominant elite.63

Similar misgivings troubled Andrés Bello in the early independence period. His writings reflected "the clear influence of the classical conceptions of Roman law... deriving his thinking from Aquinas and the

seventeenth-century Thomists while rejecting Rousseau's notions about the presocial natural rights of man." Bello saw Latin Americans as better prepared for political emancipation than for individual liberties. His approval of Bolívar's proposal for a lifetime president in Bolivia further underlined his fears that the absence of a democratic tradition would work against the effective performance of representative institutions.

Liberty does not stand alone as some people think; it is allied with all the national traits, and it improves them without changing their nature. . . . Administrative measures now retard the movement, now hasten it, without doubt. But it is necessary that we should not exaggerate its power. There are moral obstacles that it cannot banish. They are natural accidents that it is impossible to change.

Although countless other thinkers might be cited, Bolívar and Bello provide characteristic testimony to the nineteenth-century preoccupation with the clash between individual liberty and authority. Along another dimension, enduring economic inequalities made the enjoyment of political liberty episodic even under optimal conditions. Monist traditions, however, continued to legitimize asymmetrical relationships among non-equals, calling for individual civic deference to the ultimate authority. Governance was necessary for the protection of social harmony and order, with the state reflecting the primacy attributed to it by the organicists.

With the coming of a new century, attitudes toward the role and responsibility of the state began to change, and the focus shifted toward more complex and contradictory interrelationships between society and the state. Theories came to reflect a more pragmatic awareness of, and sensitivity toward, national circumstances. The state was now regarded as more directly responsible for service to the body politic. It was to become the instrumentality whereby society might be transformed to the benefit of the collectivity. This signified a turning away from the more individualistic notions of society and the traditional evolutionary concept of the state implicit in much of the nineteenth-century literature. Attention was directed to the dilemma of extending socioeconomic rights without restricting liberty. Thus, critics could argue, as did Apter in a broader context, that political liberty leading to inequality and social terms meant "a divided nation, a political system riddled with con-

64. Jorrín and Martz, Latin-American Political Thought, p. 96.
flict, a polarized rather than cooperative society, and political instability.” 66

Given these conflicting traditions and a growing awareness of socioeconomic inequities, the soil was fertile for the sowing of radical ideas and the flourishing of socialist thought. As the modern state began to take shape, it reflected increasingly the competitive as well as complementary notions embedded in the three intellectual approaches. A shared concern over the role and impact of the state provided the basis for renewed dialogue, and it informed the analytic models that contemporary scholars designed and put forward. Despite their many disagreements, they recognized that the state’s responsibilities throughout the hemisphere must inexorably increase.

**Perspectives on the Role of the State**

In seeking formulae that protect individual liberties and rights amidst increasingly complex socioeconomic relationships, scholars have provided varied, sometimes idiosyncratic, responses. Liberal pluralists, corporatists, dependentistas—all have described ever more complex and sophisticated state structures, meanwhile reiterating deference to individual freedom. As a result, the blend of traditions has been repeatedly evident. The heirs to Enlightenment concepts and the exponents of contemporary liberal pluralism illustrate the point. Consider that Social Democratic and Christian Democratic movements have stood at the center of pluralistic democracy. Both have combined a commitment to individual freedom with ever-increasing reliance upon the state. The former has had its intellectual roots in Marxist thought, while the latter rested on Thomistic principles consistent with monist conceptions of the state. Yet their evolution has brought them to broadly similar positions, despite doctrinal differences.

Whatever the labels, liberal developmentalists have advocated state capitalism as the governmental form fundamental to the fullest realization of individual liberties. The concern with democratic institutions, majority rule, and structural forms of representation hark back to Enlightenment ideas. The apparatus of popular sovereignty has been postulated as the framework within which reforms may be introduced and democratic pluralism strengthened. Power is thus to be allocated and shared throughout the citizenry, with moderation and toleration of opposition a *sine qua non.*

Citizens of a democracy must tolerate opposition even when presented by vicious or stupid men. . . . This disposition is manifested through the practice, not merely the profession, of great self-restraint. A democrat believing sincerely that his opponents are thoroughly and absolutely wrong must still live and work with them, permit and even encourage their participation in the self-governing process of the whole.\textsuperscript{67}

This is combined with a relentless faith in the role of the state as arbiter and, indeed, as the motor force of society.

There is also a corporatist concern with state capitalism, although qualitatively distinctive. It follows the monistic tradition in projecting the Platonic vision of a powerful state responsible for societal harmony and justice through a unified central authority. Meritocracy is linked to a predisposition in favor of state authority seeking to be free of a presumably ignorant and politically innocent populace. True justice is regarded as unrealizable through institutions resting on mechanistic equality. The genuinely just society should recognize itself as unequal; the individual attains fulfillment only through the guidance of enlightened state authority. Individual freedom, while important, must be subordinated to the necessity of state dominance. Leadership becomes especially crucial, particularly "in situations where democracy has been little more than an abstract ideal or where its interpretation is changing rapidly." \textsuperscript{68}

These seemingly collectivist manifestations of monist thought, in terms of state organization, overlap with certain tenets of socialism. The exponents of the latter allege that liberal pluralism actually amounts to elitist rather than truly popular rule. Participation is restricted to limited electoral competition; the weak, poor, and dispossessed are ultimately ignored. Socialist remedies, emanating from the radical philosophical tradition, would liberate the individual not by reconciling conflicting class relationships but by destroying capitalist structures. The miseries of capitalism provide the stimulus for renewed mobilization of the masses. And while the ultimate objective is a society without state authority, realization of this ideal requires a prior period of highly centralized collectivism and state authority.

Socialist revolutionary strategies and tactics are not without an element of mutual tension. This is not the place to review the theories of Mariá-

\textsuperscript{68} Lee C. Fennell, "Leadership and the Failure of Democracy," in Wiarda, The Continuing Struggle, p. 211.
tegui, Lombardo Toledano, Castro, Guevara, Allende, and others. Yet agreement on the presumed dismantling of the capitalist state leads to the necessity of at least temporary replacement by a new and omnipotent central authority. The ultimate concern over individual rights then represents a final closing of the circle. Guevara anticipated a state-inspired reconstruction of the individual as a morally uplifted "new socialist man." Lombardo Toledano saw an alliance of the urban proletariat with other social sectors as leading toward the ultimate classless society. For Allende, reification of the worker would enhance state authority as it led the masses in the march toward true communism.

Such observations, illustrative rather than exhaustive, underline the presence of common threads, as well as opposing assumptions, between and among Latin America's three orienting traditions. Their durability and persistence over many generations argue that contemporary analytic models should take account of behavior stemming from all three worldviews. Approaches which champion only one of the traditions will continue to be flawed. Whatever the philosophical and ideological bases from which the individual, society, and state are to be visualized, it is urgent that sources of conceptual complementarity be sought. The imperative for integrative conceptualizing is powerful. Unless one denies that the three orienting traditions collectively reflect the Latin American intellectual milieu, all three must be incorporated in building new and more insightful empirical models.