The Evolution of Operational Code Analysis

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Operational code analysis has evolved from a classic work by Nathan Leites, A Study of Bolshevism (1953), in which he first analyzed the operational code of the Politburo as a mix of cognitive heuristics and characterological personality traits that influenced Soviet decision making. Alexander George and Ole Holsti then isolated the cognitive aspects of the operational code construct and conceptualized them as a typology of political belief systems. Other scholars have applied this typology to explain the link between the beliefs and behavior of American foreign policymakers. The mixed results from these efforts have led to a revival of interest in the relationship between the cognitive and the characterological dimensions of operational code analysis. The aim of contemporary operational code analysis is a theoretical synthesis of the cognitive and affective influences upon foreign policy decisions identified by middle-range cognitive and motivational theories of political psychology.

KEY WORDS: operational code; beliefs; personality theory; foreign policy decisions.

INTRODUCTION

Nathan Leites introduced the operational code construct into the domain of political psychology in his classic, two-volume work, The Operational Code of the Politburo (1951) and A Study of Bolshevism (1953). Merton (1940) had earlier coined the phrase “operational code” to refer to the values, world view, and response repertoire which an individual acquires and shares with other members of an organization. In A Study of Bolshevism...
vism, Leites extended the scope of operational code analysis beyond Mer-
ton's sociological approach to organizational decision-making into the
domains of social psychology and psychoanalysis. He first identified the
shared response repertoire of the Politburo's members as a series of decision-
making rules, e.g., "push to the limit" (in a conflict situation), and axioms,
e.g., "politics is a war," that constituted the world view upon which these
rules were based. Then he accounted for their origins with a psychocultural
analysis of the fundamental motivations associated with Bolshevism and their
manifestation in varying degrees in the personalities of Lenin and Stalin
(Leites, 1953; cf. also Leites, 1964).
Fifteen years later in a review article, "The 'operational code': A neglect-
ed approach to the study of political leaders and decision-making," Alex-
ander George (1969) reexamined Leites's pioneering analysis of elite belief
systems and asked why its example had not been followed with similar
research on other leadership groups. In addressing this question, George
(1969, p. 193) noted "the unusually complex nature of Leites' work, which
is not one but several interrelated studies that are subtly interwoven." He
concluded that "while the complexity of the work adds to its richness and
intellectual appeal, it has also made it unusually difficult for readers to grasp
its structure or to describe its research mode" (George, 1969, p. 193). To
overcome this obstacle, George concentrated upon one portion of A Study
of Bolshevism, the "operational code," which Leites had published previ-
ously in abbreviated form as a separate volume.
In extracting the operational code portion from the larger study, Ge-
orge acknowledged that he was also excluding some of its features. In A Study
of Bolshevism, Leites (1953, p. 15) attempted to "study the spirit of a ruling
group... [through]... the analysis of [one aspect of]... its doctrine.... what
I call the operational code, that is, the conceptions of political 'strategy'."
Consequently, as George (1969, p. 194) points out

...[T]he "operational code" blends and merges at many points with the discussion
of "Bolshevik character." The maxims of political strategy that comprise the "opera-
tional code" take on the character of rules of conduct held out for good Bolsheviks
and norms of behavior that, ideally, are internalized by the individual who thereby
acquires a new and different character structure— that of the reliable, "hard core"
Bolshevik. In the terminology of modern ego psychology, the individual who suc-
ceeds in internalizing this preferred character structure thereby accomplishes an "iden-
tity transformation." (Emphasis George's)

George's intent was to factor out the psychoanalytically based, charactero-
logical aspect of operational code analysis and focus upon the "maxims of
political strategy" solely as beliefs. Viewed as cognitive rather than affective
phenomena, he argued that these premises would be more susceptible to in-
vestigation and analysis by political scientists (George, 1969, p. 195). In the
remainder of his review essay he presented an essentially cognitive re-analysis
of the Bolshevik operational code, which became a paradigm for subsequent operational code studies.

Taking the findings reported in the Leites study and borrowing the distinction between "epistemological" and "instrumental" beliefs from Brim et al. (1962), George organized Leites's results as "answers" to the following set of questions designed to tap philosophical and instrumental beliefs in the Bolshevik ideology. Whereas philosophical (i.e., epistemological) beliefs refer to assumptions and premises about the fundamental nature of politics, the nature of political conflict, and the role of the individual in history, instrumental beliefs focus upon ends-means relationships in the context of political action (George, 1969, pp. 199-216).

**PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS**

1. What is the "essential" nature of political life? Is the political universe one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents?
2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic or must one be pessimistic on this score, and in what respects the one and/or the other?
3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?
4. How much "control" or "mastery" can one have over historical development? What is one's role in "moving" and "shaping" history in the desired direction?
5. What is the role of "chance" in human affairs and in historical development?

**INSTRUMENTAL QUESTIONS**

1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?
2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?
3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?
4. What is the best "timing" of action to advance one's interests?
5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests?

Theoretically, the Bolsheviks' answers to these questions act as "boundaries" for rational decision-making in the sense associated with Herbert Simon's concept of "bounded rationality" (March and Simon, 1958, cited by George, 1969, p. 198). The beliefs function as guides to political decision-making, especially under conditions of relative uncertainty about the con-
sequences of choosing one course of action rather than another. In George's (1969, p. 200) words,

Knowledge of the actor's approach to calculating choice of action does not provide a simple key to explanation and prediction; but it can help the researcher and the policy planner to "bound" the alternative ways in which the subject may perceive different types of situations and approach the task of making a rational assessment of alternative courses of action. Knowledge of the actor's beliefs helps the investigator to clarify the general criteria, requirements, and norms the subject attempts to meet in assessing opportunities that arise to make desirable gains, in estimating the costs and risks associated with them, and in making utility calculations.

The individual's philosophical beliefs aid in diagnosing the definition of the situation, while instrumental beliefs influence the prescription of appropriate responses.

However, George (1969, p. 196) cautioned that the elements of the code should be viewed "as a set of premises and beliefs about politics and not as a set of rules and recipes to be applied mechanically to the choice of action...." In an essay published a decade later, George (1979, pp. 95-124) elaborated upon the nature of the causal nexus between an actor's operational code beliefs and political behavior. Because these beliefs are of a general rather than a specific character, he argued (pp. 101 ff.) that two theoretical premises follow:

Beliefs of this kind influence decision-making indirectly by influencing the information-processing tasks that precede and accompany the decision-maker's choice of action;

Such beliefs do not unilaterally determine his choice of action; other variables are also at work in determining what he will do.

George also identified two techniques to detect the impact of operational-code beliefs upon decisions. The "congruence" procedure establishes consistency "between the content of given beliefs and the content of the decision(s)." The "process-tracing" procedure traces in detail the steps in the process wherein the beliefs influence the process of defining the situation, identifying options and then evaluating them prior to choice. The first procedure establishes a plausible link between beliefs and behavior by drawing attention to the possibility that the correlation is of causal significance. The second procedure assesses and may strengthen the link by making observations of the intervening causal sequence between stimulus and response (George, 1979, pp. 105-119). For a more detailed discussion of these two procedures, see George and McKeown (1985).

The research program established by the Leites-George paradigm for operational code analysis, therefore, had the following assumptions and inference patterns:

Decision makers vary significantly in choice propensities, beliefs, and personality traits;

These characteristics structure the decision-maker's range of goals and shape the analysis of alternatives by the decision maker;
Insofar as possible, a policy-maker's choices are selected which are consistent with these principles and constitute the boundaries of rational behavior for the decision-maker.

This paradigm is really a variant of the classical rational-actor paradigm of decision-making that informs much of mainstream political scientists' professional understanding of national policy decisions. Actions are explained by reference to the actor's goals and by reproducing the calculations which led to the decision. Instead of making the classical rational-actor assumption that all decision-makers operate with the same approach to rationality under conditions of uncertainty, however, operational code analysis emphasizes their idiosyncratic features across different decision-makers (Allison, 1971, pp. 36-38).

Consequently, the development of operational code analysis represents a potentially "progressive problem-shift" within the tradition of the classical rational-actor paradigm (Lakatos, 1970, p. 118). That is, operational code theory offers the prospect of accommodating the classical model's successful explanations and also accounting systematically for its anomalies. The Leites study of the Bolsheviks is considered a classic because it addressed important theoretical and real-world questions which were anomalies within the rational actor paradigm's traditional theoretical context. George's version of the operational code, in particular, introduced a psychological variant of decision-making theory that "can be inferred or postulated by the investigator on the basis of the kinds of data, observational opportunities, and methods generally available to political scientists" (George, 1969, p. 195). Both Leites and George recognized, as have so many scholars, that the way national leaders view the world and each other fundamentally affects their policy choices.

Methodologically, Leites's work illustrated how qualitative content analysis can yield fruitful insights into the spirit of a ruling group. At the same time, the study manifested many of the usual problems of reliability and validity associated with this kind of content analysis. George refined this technique with his inventory of philosophical and instrumental questions. This accounting scheme guided a series of comparable case studies of American decision-makers, in turn, and eventually generated a typology of operational codes. We shall scrutinize two of these case studies below in order to demonstrate the refinement of the content analysis techniques employed in an attempt to link beliefs and behavior. First, however, let us consider the typology and its general relationship to the entire set of case studies.

In the course of developing more refined coding categories for operational code beliefs, Holsti (1977) implemented a three-step strategy to formulate six political belief systems based upon the philosophical and instrumental questions formulated by George.

Following Converse's definition, he conceptualized a political belief system as "a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some

Inspired by the observation of George (1969, pp. 202, 221) and others (e.g., Putnam, 1973, p. 125), that the nature of political life and the image of the opponent are major sources of constraint on the contents of other political beliefs, Holsti then identified hypothetical answers to the relevant Georgian philosophical questions dealing with the primary source of conflict in the political universe and whether conflict is temporary or permanent. (Holsti, 1977, pp. 156-157)

Finally, he inferred that, if a decision-maker's operational code conforms to Converse's definition of a belief system, then differences in these philosophical beliefs across individuals should act as constraining “master beliefs” and lead to consistent differences in the remaining interdependent philosophical and instrumental beliefs. (Holsti, 1977, pp. 39-40, 156-157)

This effort yielded a typology of belief systems, A, B, C, D, E, and F, defined and derived from the intersection of the two master beliefs in Fig. 1 (Holsti, 1977, pp. 156-157ff.).

Holsti (1976, p. 30; 1977, pp. 16-18) also identified the situational characteristics which would allow beliefs to influence behavior. They included situations that are open to a variety of interpretations (because of ambiguous, scarce, or complex information) in which the beliefs of a strategically located decision-maker may be most influential in defining and selecting

![Fig. 1. The master beliefs in the Holsti typology of operational code belief systems (Source: Holsti, 1977, p. 158).](image-url)
among options. The dominant inference pattern established by these conditions is a series of interactive statements between the position of the decision-maker and environmental features, which are consistent with both of George's theoretical premises about the causal nexus between beliefs and behavior.

Holsti's formulation of an operational code typology has the following characteristics as a social-psychological theory of cognitive consistency. The basic unit of analysis is individual behavior constrained by the decision maker's belief system. The key concepts are philosophical and instrumental beliefs, belief system, and foreign policy strategies and tactics. The dominant inference pattern is the principle of cognitive consistency, from which are derived two general propositions: (a) beliefs tend to reinforce one another to form a coherent belief system; (b) under specified conditions beliefs constrain the range of alternative choices and thereby influence the final decision (Holsti, 1977; Walker, 1989, p. 20).

Holsti's application of Converse's (1964) definition of belief system to develop a set of operational code types, therefore, is a pivotal development in the evolution of operational code analysis. It synthesized the case studies of decision-making inspired by George's (1969) article and defined new lines of inquiry into the cognitive consistency, the psychodynamic origins, and the behavioral consequences of operational code belief systems. The major empirical questions raised by the typology were the following:

Do the philosophical and instrumental beliefs of foreign policy decision-makers constitute a "belief system?"

Do these belief systems resemble the ideal types of belief systems in the Holsti typology?

Do each of these types of belief systems consistently influence in different ways the strategically-located individual's definition of the situation, his decision, and its implementation under the conditions of ambiguity, scarcity and complexity specified by the operational code theory of cognitive consistency?

These questions raise subsidiary questions regarding the measurement and analysis techniques which will identify and relate beliefs, situations, decisions, and behavior in a reliable and valid way.

George (1969) has illustrated the potential use of qualitative content analysis in his re-examination of the Leites study, while Holsti (1977, pp. 37-145) has explored the use of quantitative content analysis by constructing a manual for retrieving the beliefs in his typology. However, they have left to other scholars the tasks of putting these two types of content analysis to extensive use.

After the appearance of George's (1969) article, several operational code case studies of U.S. decision-makers followed. The subjects included John Foster Dulles, Frank Church, Arthur Vandenberg, Dean Acheson, Henry Kissinger, James F. Byrnes, J. William Fulbright, and Mark Hatfield (Anderson, 1973a,b; Caldwell, 1976; Holsti, 1970, 1977; Johnson, 1977; McLel-
lan, 1971; Tweraser, 1974; Walker, 1977). The authors applied the qualitative technique to documents in the public and private domains which might contain expressions of philosophical and instrumental beliefs. There were also a few studies of foreign decision-makers, e.g., Kurt Schumacher, Willy Brandt, and Ramsey MacDonald, which employed essentially the same research design to guide the examination of the documentary record (Ashby, 1969; Holsti, 1977; Kavanagh, 1970).

Holsti (1977, pp. 179-200) reanalyzed these case studies to see whether the results revealed the existence of coherent belief systems that fit into his operational code typology. However, no one has used quantitative content analysis in an extensive fashion to identify the operational codes of these individuals and validate his conclusion that their belief systems fit his typology. Instead, there have been attempts to establish validity indirectly and with other methods than content analysis with the following results:

Stuart and Starr (1980/81) examined the rhetoric of Dulles, Kennedy, and Kissinger to see if the attributions associated with evaluative assertion analysis (Osgood et al., 1956) vary across these decision-makers in a pattern that is consistent with their predictions; in turn, these hypotheses are based upon qualitative content analyses of their operational code beliefs.

Walker (1977) is another example of this strategy, in which predictions about the bargaining behavior of the U.S. government in the Vietnam War were based upon a qualitative content analysis of Kissinger's operational code.

Indirect tests of validity typically make predictions about the behavior of the individual or the actions of his government under the conditions specified by operational code theory and based upon a qualitative content analysis of operational code beliefs. In both of these studies, the quantitative results validated the qualitative analysis that identified their belief systems.

An example of the multimethod validity strategy is Holsti's (1977, pp. 201-269) administration of a questionnaire to the authors of the qualitative content analyses of American decision-makers based upon the Georgian accounting scheme. They were asked to classify the philosophical and instrumental beliefs of their subjects. Again, the results tended to validate the qualitative content analysis. Each coder tended to identify beliefs that were consistent with one another individually and, more generally, with one of the types of belief systems in the Holsti typology.

A subsequent operational code analysis of an American decision-maker that did not fit easily into one of the Holsti types is Stuart's (1979) qualitative content analysis of John F. Kennedy's statements and writings. Guided by the categories in the Holsti typology, Stuart found a mixture of beliefs from more than one of the operational code types and attributed this result to a combination of ambiguities and overlapping beliefs in the typology plus the complexity of Kennedy's belief system. Walker's (1983) revision of the Holsti typology confirmed Stuart's evaluation that ambiguities and overlap-
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ping beliefs existed in the original version and offered a revised version (see Fig. 2).

Walker and Falkowski (1984a,b) used the revised version of the Holsti typology as the basis for their research into the relationship between the crisis bargaining tactics of U.S. presidents and secretaries of state and their oper-

Type A

Philosophical: Conflict is temporary, caused by human misunderstanding and miscommunica-
tion. A "conflict spiral," based upon misperception and impulsive responses, is the major danger of war. Opponents are often influenced by nonrational conditions, but tend to respond in kind to conciliation and firmness. Optimism is warranted, based upon a leader's ability and willingness to shape historical development. The future is relatively predictable, and control over it is possible. Instrumental: Establish goals within a framework that emphasizes shared interest. Pursue broadly international goals incrementally with flexible strategies that control risks by avoiding escalation and acting quickly when conciliation opportunities arise. Emphasize resources that establish a climate for negotiation and compromise and avoid the early use of force.

Type B

Philosophical: Conflict is temporary, caused by warlike states; miscalculation and appeasement are the major causes of war. Opponents are rational and deterrable. Optimism is warranted regarding realization of goals. The political future is relatively predictable, and control over historical development is possible. Instrumental: One should seek optimal goals vigorously within a comprehensive framework. Control risks by limiting means rather than ends. Any tactic and resource may be appropriate, including the use of force when it offers prospects for large gains with limited risk.

Type C

Philosophical: Conflict is temporary; it is possible to restructure the state system to reflect the latent harmony of interests. The source of conflict is the anarchical state system, which permits a variety of causes to produce war. Opponents vary in nature, goals, and responses to conciliation and firmness. One should be pessimistic about goals unless the state system is changed, because predictability and control over historical development is low under anarchy. Instrumental: Establish optimal goals vigorously within a comprehensive framework. Pursue shared goals, but control risks by limiting means rather than ends. Act quickly when conciliation opportunities arise and delay escalatory actions whenever possible; other resources than military capabilities are useful.

Type DEF

Philosophical: Conflict is permanent, caused by human nature (D), nationalism (E) or international anarchy (F). Power disequilibria are major dangers of war. Opponents may vary, and responses to conciliation or firmness are uncertain. Optimism declines over the long run and in the short run depends upon the quality of leadership and a power equilibrium. Predictability is limited, as is control over historical development. Instrumental: Seek limited goals flexibly with moderate means. Use military force if the opponent and circumstances require it, but only as a final resource.

Fig. 2. Revised Holsti typology (Source: Walker, 1983, 1986).
ational codes. In their research design they attempted to measure the operational code beliefs of Truman, Marshall, Eisenhower, Dulles, Kennedy, Rusk, and Johnson and to link them to the selection of sequences of moves by their governments during a pair of crises which occurred during their respective administrations. They used a questionnaire administered to colleagues and biographers of these leaders to determine their operational code beliefs and found that the results conformed neither to the six types of belief systems in the original Holsti typology nor to the four types in the revised version of the typology.

Instead, they found a series of hybrid types, in which the decision-makers' schemata were combinations of philosophical and instrumental beliefs from four types. The interesting and potentially important aggregate pattern in these hybrids is the overlap between the organization of these cognitive beliefs and the configuration of motivational imagery for these decision-makers. Although the beliefs of these leaders did not form a belief system as conceptualized by cognitive psychology, they were compatible schemata for the expression in the political domain of personal needs for power, affiliation, and achievement as conceptualized by motivational psychology (cf. Winter and Stewart, 1977). The aggregate pattern of crisis bargaining tactics by the governments of these decision-makers tended to correspond to these congruent patterns of motivations and beliefs (Walker and Falkowski, 1984b).

These results suggest a future research agenda with the following tasks. One is to establish a strong conceptual bridge between operational code analysis and recent research in motivational psychology dealing with the needs for power, affiliation, and achievement. Another is to replace the belief-system version of cognitive consistency theory with insights from the “revolution in cognitive psychology” (Herrmann, 1988). The operational code construct may turn out to be a useful umbrella for integrating various middle-range theories of cognitive and motivational psychology into a “grand theory” of political psychology.

However, it is also possible that operational code research may be annexed by one of these neighboring research communities or partitioned among them. An individual's operational code may structure the “menu for choice,” thereby defining the range of the decision-maker's choice propensities, but operational code theory is relatively silent about the cognitive and emotional processes that accompany the specific definitions of the situation, decision, and action. The connection between an individual's operational code and political behavior, therefore, has often been asserted either on intuitive grounds or established with the “congruence” technique in somewhat general terms by reference to a general relationship between the code's contents and aggregate behavior patterns. The “process-tracing” technique has not
been employed extensively to examine intervening attribution processes and perceptions, which are the immediate antecedents of behavior (George, 1979).

Indeed, these cognitive processes have tended to be defined by some critics of operational code analysis as rival psychological approaches (e.g., Cottam, 1986, pp. 9-17). The findings from this literature relevant to the understanding of foreign policy decision-making have not been overlooked (cf., Jervis, 1976), but there has been relatively little effort expended to relate them either to the operational code approach or to the literature dealing with motivations and personality. Nor has there been much energy exerted to explore the relationships between operational code traits and the motivational processes of ego defense associated with personality theory.

The cognitive process literature has also developed autonomously from motivational psychology and personality theory, except for acknowledging that motivated biases as well as cognitive biases occur in the processing of information (Jervis, 1976, pp. 356-381; Jervis, 1985, pp. 1-33). The sources and nature of motivated biases have not yet been given intensive scrutiny by cognitive theorists, even though there is growing recognition that this effort may be worthwhile (Emmons, 1987, p. 16; LeBow, 1981; Tetlock and Levi, 1982). Their reluctance to tackle this task is understandable, because it could invoke a broader, explicitly extracognitive, theoretical context for interpreting such processes of social cognition as attribution, schematization, and dissonance reduction.

Operational code analysis may have the potential to facilitate this task, because it has evolved into a research program with both motivational and cognitive dimensions. Two recent examples illustrate this potential. One is a study which investigates Woodrow Wilson's operational code within the context of the debate over the relationship between Wilson's personality and the self-defeating pattern of his political decision-making during the ratification debate over the Treaty of Versailles (Walker, 1986). The other is a study of Henry Kissinger by Starr (1984), who attempts to link personality, beliefs, perceptions, and foreign policy behavior.

The research design for the Wilson study is relevant to the task of integrating motivational and cognitive explanations in three respects:

The investigation is guided by the formulation of an operational code theory which incorporates motivational and cognitive dispositions. (Walker, 1983, pp. 188-195)
The hypotheses for investigation are derived from an explicit pair of rival personality disorders testable within the context of operational code theory. (George and George, 1964; Tucker, 1977, Post, 1983)
The measurement of motivations and beliefs is done with quantitative content analysis techniques. (Walker, 1986)

The analysis involves a comparison of the congruence between the cognitive schemata in Wilson's annual addresses to Congress with the motivational imagery in Wilson's speeches during three decision-making episodes, includ-
ing the Versailles Treaty debate as well as the "Tampico Affair" with Mexico and the U.S. entry into World War I. The aggregate patterns of philosophical and instrumental beliefs, needs for power, affiliation, and achievement across these sources were found to be generally consistent with the expansion of George and George's (1964) interpretation of Wilson's personality advanced by Post (1983) and anticipated by Tucker (1977).

Starr's (1984) book-length study divides into two parts dealing, respectively, with Kissinger's personality and his perceptions of international politics. The research design integrates a psychobiographical method for analyzing the development of Kissinger's personality, a qualitative content analysis of his operational code beliefs, and a quantitative content analysis for classifying his perceptions of the Soviet Union and China. There is also an attempt to link changes in Kissinger's perceptions with changes in the behavior of the U.S. government toward the two Communist countries.

Starr established a theoretically consistent link between Kissinger's operational code and his perceptions of the Soviet Union by means of the process-tracing technique. His hypothesis was that Kissinger's belief system disposed him to be relatively "open-minded" in his perceptions of the USSR and, therefore, his general evaluation of the Soviet Union should be a function of his perceptions. He found that the Secretary of State's general evaluation of the Soviet Union did correlate significantly with his perception of Soviet hostility (Starr, 1984, pp. 99-105).

However, Starr failed to confirm a hypothesized congruent relationship between Kissinger's perceptions and American foreign policy behavior. He concludes after an exhaustive statistical analysis:

"It is apparent that Kissinger's images are not congruent with American foreign-policy behavior. Although Kissinger was the dominant foreign-policy decision maker during the period under investigation, his words— and the evaluative assertions that they contained— did not simply and directly reflect American behavior toward the Soviet Union and China. (Starr, 1984, p. 142)"

The mixed results reported by Starr for the relationships among beliefs, perceptions, and behavior illustrate both the promise and the problems associated with employing the process-tracing form of operational code analysis.

Beliefs may explain both perceptions and behavior; however, the link is not the straightforward one implied by Starr's hypotheses, viz., Beliefs → Perceptions of the Object → Behavior toward the Object. Instead, the linkages may be more complex. For example:

The instrumental beliefs in an individual's operational code might prescribe the same behavior toward different types of objects. Therefore, object-perceptions would vary, but behavior would not.

The philosophical beliefs in an operational code may dispose an actor to diagnose differently the respective situations surrounding two objects of the same type or even
the same object at two different observation points. Therefore, object-perceptions would not vary, but behavior would.

Either possibility could account for Starr’s statistically insignificant relationships between perceptions and behavior (Walker, 1988, 1989). A more complex alternative hypothesis is that Starr’s focus upon images as a basis for predicting behavior is correct—however, the focus should be upon self-images rather than object-images. That is, a close link may instead exist between self-schema/self-scripts and behavior. From this perspective, “answers” to George’s questions for tapping instrumental beliefs about effective political action become dimensions of the decision-maker’s self-scripts for acting in the political universe. These self-scripts, in turn, are expressions of motivations embedded deeply in the individual’s personality (Walker, 1987, 1989).

If so, then decision-making is driven as much by the processes of ego-defense and the mediation of self-other relations as by the process of object-appraisal (Brewster-Smith, 1968). In this view, the operational code construct becomes an analytical conduit through which these processes flow and by which an analyst observes their interaction. If the evolution of operational analysis continues in this direction, it would represent a return to the characterological feature which George and Holsti excluded as they extracted and developed its cognitive aspect.

This move, in addition to being faithful to the classic tradition of operational code analysis represented by Leites, would not be totally unanticipated by his cognitive revisionists. In his seminal article, George (1969, pp. 195-196) addressed this very possibility with the following points:

[I]t is one of the attractive features of the operational code construct for behaviorally-inclined political scientists that it can serve as a useful “bridge” or “link” to psychodynamic interpretations of unconscious dimensions of belief systems and their role in behavior under different conditions...

The belief system about politics is part of the cognitive and affective portion of the ego structure of personality; as such it serves an adaptive function for coping with reality. But at the same time the emergence of a belief system may be affected by developmental problems encountered in personality formation; if so, beliefs may then also serve ego defensive functions vis-à-vis unconscious wishes and anxieties...

Thus, once an actor’s approach to political calculation has been formulated by the researchers, he can proceed—if he so wishes and is able to do so—to relate some of the beliefs in question to other motivational variables of a psychodynamic character.

Indeed, George (1969, p. 196) concludes that a knowledge of the decision-maker’s beliefs facilitates the task of assessing the extent to which behavior is based upon reality-testing or reflects the influence of latent motives and ego defenses.

In *A Study of Bolshevism*, the use of operational code analysis bridged the relationship between political choice and the cognitive, affective, and developmental features of the Bolshevik personality. This accomplishment
makes the book a metaphor for the collective aspirations of the International Society of Political Psychology as well as a classic in political psychology. The evolution of operational code analysis has remained faithful to this metaphor. Cognitive, affective, and developmental studies of political leaders have contributed to the continuation of operational code analysis as a research program in political psychology. Its example, therefore, continues to serve as a statement of the possibilities for unity among the diverse disciplines represented by the Society's membership.

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